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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

RESOLVING A COPYRIGHT LAW CIRCUIT SPLIT: THE
IMPORTANCE OF A DE MINIMIS EXCEPTION FOR SAMPLED
SOUND RECORDINGS

INTRODUCTION
Early last year, while doing research for this Note, I heard “Play That
Song”—a new single by the band Train—on my local Top 40 radio station. 1 The
melody line in the chorus instantly reminded me of “Heart and Soul,” a song I
remember tapping out on the piano when I was growing up. 2 A quick Google
search informed me that Train had indeed incorporated the 1938 song into its
new single: “[“Play That Song”] is almost a slower, Train version of a hip-hop
song with the way [the band uses] . . . the ‘Heart and Soul’ melody as their own
family-friendly version of sampling,” wrote one journalist. 3
While “sampling” actually is not the best term to describe how Train used
the “Heart and Soul” melody (as will be explained in this Note), 4 that journalist
had the right idea: the reproduction and adaptation of original songs to create
new ones has grown from its original roots in hip-hop music to become a
prevalent feature in mainstream music today. 5 With technology constantly
improving and becoming less expensive, anyone with a computer and some
relatively inexpensive software can digitally copy a song and mix his or her own
professional-quality tracks. 6 And as the number of artists copying pieces of older
works for use in their own music has increased over the years, so too has the
confusion regarding copyright law in this area.

1. TRAIN, PLAY THAT SONG (Columbia Records 2016).
2. Others may instead recall Tom Hanks and Robert Loggia playing the tune on a giant FAO
Schwartz keyboard in the movie Big. BIG (20th Century Fox 1988).
3. Tom Shackleford, Train Put New Spin on “Heart and Soul” with New Single, “Play That
Song,” AXS (2016), https://www.axs.com/train-put-new-spin-on-heart-and-soul-with-new-singleplay-that-song-107411 [https://perma.cc/ADG5-JVCC].
4. “Sampling” will be defined and further discussed herein. See infra Section I.B.
5. To see just how prevalent sampling has become, look no further than the website
WhoSampled, where a community of 17,000 contributors work to detail the connections between
more than 487,000 songs and 164,000 artists from nearly all genres of music. While not all of the
songs listed on the site actually contain “samples” according to the legal definition discussed in this
Note (some are cover songs and remixes), it is nonetheless an interesting view on the “DNA of
music” and a foray into the world of borrowing and reproducing that is such a big part of the music
industry today. WHOSAMPLED, http://www.whosampled.com/ [https://perma.cc/36LC-64PL].
6. JOANNA DEMERS, STEAL THIS MUSIC: HOW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AFFECTS
MUSICAL CREATIVITY 72 (2006).
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Copyright law in the United States attempts to balance the goal of protecting
a creator’s original works while also avoiding the stifling of further creativity. 7
It seeks to make it possible for artists to enjoy “the fruits of their creations,”
without fencing those works off from the rest of the world. 8 But for many types
of copyrightable material, these goals can sometimes be difficult to balance and
often end up at odds with each other.
The challenge of balancing these goals is perhaps most clearly illustrated in
a recent split between the Sixth and Ninth Circuits. The issue at the center of the
split is whether a de minimis analysis can be applied when artists “sample”
copyrighted sound recordings, thus potentially allowing them to avoid copyright
infringement. For many years, the answer to this question was “no,” based upon
a 2005 ruling by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 9 But
in June 2016, the Ninth Circuit came to the exact opposite conclusion, finding
that a de minimis exception could apply to sampled sound recordings and
creating a split between the two circuits. 10
The circuit split must be resolved to eliminate confusion both within the
legal community and the music industry, and this Note will argue that the Ninth
Circuit’s decision is the correct one, that a de minimis exception should be
allowed in cases involving samples of copyrighted sound recordings. To provide
some context for the two circuit court decisions, Part I of this Note will present
a brief background of copyright law in general, as well as provide information
about digital sampling and the cases that provided legal guidance before the
circuit split occurred. 11 Part II will discuss the facts, analysis, and conclusion of
the Sixth Circuit decision, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 12 that
provided the precedent in sampling cases involving sound recordings up until
June 2016. 13 Part III will introduce the recent Ninth Circuit case VMG Salsoul,
LLC v. Ciccone, 14 which created the current split in the circuits. 15 Part IV will
analyze both circuits’ decisions in an attempt to find which one best matches the
intent of Congress, the goal of judicial efficiency, and the fundamental purpose
of American copyright law, as well as which has the most positive impact on the
music industry. 16 Finally, I will conclude in Part V that the VMG Salsoul

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 800 (6th Cir. 2005).
Id.
Id. at 805.
VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 886 (9th Cir. 2016).
See infra Part I.
410 F.3d at 792.
See infra Part II.
824 F.3d at 871.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
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decision best fits within the abovementioned contexts, and therefore the de
minimis exception should be allowed in digital sampling cases. 17
I. BACKGROUND
A.

Brief Overview of Music Copyright Law

American copyright law is grounded in the Constitution, which gives
Congress the power to enact copyright legislation. 18 Article I, Section 8 of the
U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” 19 In
accordance with this enumerated power, Congress began to develop federal
copyright law in 1790, 20 initially only creating laws to protect books, maps, and
charts, but eventually extending those protections to musical works as well. 21 As
creative works and technology have evolved, so has copyright law, which now
gives the copyright holder a variety of rights to his or her works, including the
right to reproduce, adapt, distribute, publicly perform, and publicly display the
copyrighted work. 22 These rights are given exclusively to the owner of the
copyright (though they can be subdivided, owned, and enforced separately),
preventing others from using his or her copyrighted work without permission. 23
If someone other than the copyright owner does exercise one of these rights
without permission, he or she has committed copyright infringement, unless the
use is permitted by an established defense or limitation. 24
One of the rights given exclusively to copyright owners is the right to
reproduce—and to authorize others to reproduce—the copyrighted work. 25 This
is the right that is at issue in the world of digital sampling and copyright law.

17. See infra Part V.
18. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT OV-1 (Matthew
Bender, Rev. Ed. 2015).
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
20. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 18, at OV-1.
21. Ronald Mark Wells, You Can’t Always Get What You Want but Digital Sampling Can Get
What You Need!, 22 AKRON L. REV. 691, 692 (1989).
22. DAVID J. MOSER, MUSIC COPYRIGHT FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM 3 (2002). See 17 U.S.C.
§ 106 (2012) for the list of exclusive rights granted to the holder of a copyright.
23. MOSER, supra note 22, at 3, 54. Permission is typically granted by the copyright holder
through a license. Licenses are agreements between the copyright holder and the new user that set
out how the copyrighted work may be used and what compensation the copyright holder will
receive for allowing the use (i.e., royalties). Id.
24. Id. at 54.
25. Id. at 55.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

464

B.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 62:461

What is “Sampling”?

“Sampling” can be described as the process of making a copy of an existing
sound recording, typically through the use of technology, and incorporating any
portion of that copy into a new recording. 26 Artists must digitally record a sound
from an existing recording to create a sample, which usually lasts no more than
a few seconds at most. 27 Modern sampling technology allows artists the
opportunity to record specific notes or instruments within the original recording
and change the pitch, apply various digital effects, “loop” throughout the
background, or mix sampled segments to create a distinctive new piece of
music. 28
Some of the earliest examples of sampling can be found in the music of the
musique concrète, a style that was the “brainchild” of French engineer Pierre
Schaeffer. 29 Schaeffer and his followers cut, spliced, and manipulated prerecorded tapes to form “collages” of different sounds. 30 But sampling did not
really reach maturity until the creation of the digital sampler in the 1970s, during
which sampling entered the world of hip-hop and eventually “catapulted” into
mainstream culture. 31
The late 1980s have been referred to as sampling’s “golden age.” 32 Hip-hop
had yet to really be considered commercially successful by much of the music
industry, and this attitude gave many hip-hop artists the “opportunity to make
music exactly as they imagined it, without restrictions.” 33 Artists experimented
with and “stitched together” samples from a variety of different sources to create
distinctly new pieces of music. 34 Or, they looped well-known hooks from earlier
songs. 35 At that time, few hip-hop artists had concerns about copyright law, so
they were able to open themselves up to a “range of artistic possibilities” that

26. Astride Howell, Sample This!, 28 L.A. LAWYER 24, 24 (2005); see also Newton v.
Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003).
27. Robert M. Szymanski, Audio Pastiche: Digital Sampling, Intermediate Copying, Fair Use,
3 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 271, 275–76 (1996).
28. Id. at 276.
29. DEMERS, supra note 6, at 73.
30. Id. at 73–76; MOSER, supra note 20, at 62.
31. John Schietinger, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films: How the Sixth Circuit
Missed a Beat on Digital Music Sampling, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 209, 210–11 (2005).
32. KEMBREW MCLEOD & PETER DICOLA, CREATIVE LICENSE: THE LAW AND CULTURE OF
DIGITAL SAMPLING 19 (2011).
33. Id. at 20.
34. Id. at 20, 26. One writer describes the work of hip-hop group De La Soul, who became
famous for their sampling because “they were able to match their experimental approach with
platinum sales”: “They had an aesthetic of taking everything and the kitchen sink and throwing it
into the blender… [y]ou’d have all kinds of crazy things coming out of the mix, and it sounded the
way like a lot of people heard pop culture at that moment in time.” Id. at 20–21 (quoting Jeff
Chang).
35. Id. at 26.
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for the most part was not censored by the legal and economic interests of major
record labels. 36 But as more hip-hop albums found commercial success in the
late 1980s and the music industry began seeing the genre as a real source of
revenue, the legal landscape also began to change. 37
C. Digital Sampling and Copyright Law
Although artists using sampled material are directly copying segments of
copyrighted songs, it was not actually clear whether unauthorized sampling (i.e.,
sampling without a license to do so granted by the copyright holder) was illegal
until the early 1990s. 38 Though there had been some publicized cases of
sampling without permission and subsequent threats of copyright lawsuits, most
of these were settled outside of court, 39 and thus no clear rule was ever
established. It was not until 1991 that the uncertainty was finally cleared up. 40
In Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Brothers Records, the Southern District
of New York established that unauthorized sampling was a violation of U.S.
copyright law (and, as the judge famously proclaimed, the seventh
commandment). 41
The Grand Upright decision sparked several other cases involving
sampling-related claims and so litigation in the area increased. 42 But because
sampling cases involved songs that contained only segments of original works,
instead of exact and whole copies, many courts began applying a de minimis
analysis—that is, they looked at whether the copying was so small or so trivial

36. Id. at 20, 26. Public Enemy is another group well-known for their sampling, and have been
seen as taking sampling “to the level of high art while keeping intact hip-hop’s populist heart.” Id.
at 22. The group apparently did not even bother to clear the many samples in their hit song “Fight
the Power” because samplers during that “magical window of time” did not see it is as necessary:
“[C]opyright law didn’t affect us yet. [Major labels] hadn’t even realized what samplers did.” Id.
at 26 (quoting Chuck D).
37. MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 32, at 27.
38. MOSER, supra note 22, at 62.
39. Id. One example of this is the 1990 hit, “Ice Ice Baby” by Vanilla Ice, which sampled the
melody line from the song “Under Pressure” by Queen and David Bowie. Vanilla Ice did not obtain
permission to use the sample, but the case was never litigated as the threat of a lawsuit prompted a
settlement agreement. Id.
40. MOSER, supra note 22, at 62; see Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, 780
F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
41. Grand Upright, 780 F. Supp. at 183; MOSER, supra note 22, at 63. The Grand Upright
court began with an ominous, “thou shalt not steal,” setting the tone for an opinion that very clearly
paints sampling without a license as a “callous disregard for the law and for the rights of others.”
Grand Upright, 780 F. Supp. at 183, 185.
42. MOSER, supra note 22, at 63; see, e.g., All Nations Music v. Christian Family Network,
Inc., 989 F. Supp. 863, 865 (W.D. Mich. 1997); Jarvis v. A & M Records, 827 F. Supp. 282, 286
(D.N.J. 1993).
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that it avoided copyright infringement. 43 Most notable of these was Newton v.
Diamond, a Ninth Circuit case in which the court examined a six-second, threenote segment of a composition by jazz flutist James W. Newton that the Beastie
Boys had sampled for one of their own songs. 44 The court held that the use of a
segment of a copyrighted song is de minimis “only if the average audience would
not recognize the appropriation,” and concluded that the Beastie Boys’ sample
fit that definition of a de minimis use and therefore was not actionable under
copyright law. 45
At this point it is necessary to make a distinction regarding copyrights for
musical works: a single song actually contains two different copyrights, one for
the musical composition and another for the sound recording. 46 The words and
music make up the “musical composition” of a song, and this copyright is owned
by the songwriter (unless assigned to someone else, like the publisher). 47 The
“sound recording,” on the other hand, is the actual recorded rendition of a song
and is usually owned by the record label. 48
In Newton, the plaintiff was the owner of the musical composition copyright
and brought the lawsuit based on an alleged infringement of that particular
copyright, and thus the analysis of the court focused exclusively on the
application of the de minimis exception to copyright infringements of
compositions. 49 With Newton as precedent, the use of the de minimis exception
has become well-established in case law involving claims of musical
composition copyright infringement. 50 However, the applicability of a de
minimis analysis to claims involving sound recordings specifically is much less
clear.
In 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit imposed a
stricter view of sampling in Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films by
holding that the de minimis analysis could not be used in cases where the
copyright infringement claims were for sound recordings. 51 Although the court
insisted it “did not pull [its] interpretation out of thin air,” there was no judicial
precedent for it to follow as it was the first circuit court to examine the issue of
whether the de minimis exception could be applied specifically to sound

43. KEVIN PARKS, MUSIC & COPYRIGHT IN AMERICA: TOWARD THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX
163 (2012).
44. 388 F.3d 1189, 1190 (9th Cir. 2003).
45. Id. at 1190, 1193.
46. Howell, supra note 26, at 24, 26. For a clear portrayal of the two different types of musical
copyrights and the scope of their protections, see DEMERS, supra note 6, at 22.
47. Howell, supra note 26, at 24.
48. Id. at 24, 26.
49. Newton, 388 F.3d at 1191, 1195.
50. See, e.g., TufAmerica, Inc. v. WB Music Corp., 67 F. Supp. 3d 590, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
51. 410 F.3d 792, 798 (6th Cir. 2005).
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recordings. 52 The opinion was met with criticism 53 and sound recording
litigation continued in the district courts with varying results, 54 but the
Bridgeport holding remained the prevailing precedent with regard to sound
recordings and no other circuit court ruled on the issue. This changed in June
2016 when the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit came to the
opposite conclusion in VMG Salsoul, holding that the de minimis exception
should apply to sound recording samples, creating a split in the circuits that will
have undesirable consequences for the music industry if left unresolved. 55
II. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN BRIDGEPORT
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was the first circuit
court—and before VMG Salsoul was decided, the only one—to address whether
the de minimis exception applies to alleged infringement of copyrighted sound
recordings. 56 The court examined the issue in Bridgeport, a 2005 case that
centered around a two-second, three-note guitar riff that was looped throughout
the song “100 Miles and Runnin’” (“100 Miles”) by hip-hop group N.W.A. 57
The case actually began as a massive copyright action commenced by the
plaintiffs in 2001, alleging nearly 500 claims of copyright infringement against
800 different defendants who had used unlicensed samples of plaintiffs’ songs
in their own recordings. 58 The action was split into hundreds of separate suits,
and eventually one, Bridgeport, ended up reaching the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals. 59
One of the plaintiffs in that specific case, Westbound Records, owned the
sound recording copyright to the song “Get Off Your Ass and Jam” (“Get Off”)
by George Clinton, Jr. and the Funkadelics. 60 “Get Off” opens with a three-note
electric guitar solo that lasts four seconds. 61 N.W.A. took a two-second sample
from that guitar solo, lowered the pitch, and “looped” it so that it lasted about
seven seconds, then inserted it five times throughout their song “100 Miles.” 62
When the N.W.A. song was then featured on the soundtrack for the movie I Got
52. Id. at 802–03.
53. See infra notes 126 and 184 and accompanying text.
54. VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 886 (9th Cir. 2016); see, e.g., Steward v.
West, No. CV 13-02449 BRO (JCx), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186012, at *18–33 (C.D. Cal. Aug.
14, 2014); Batiste v. Najm, 28 F. Supp. 3d 595, 605, 626 (E.D. La. 2014); EMI Records Ltd. v.
Premise Media Corp, No. 601209-08, 2008 WL 5027245, at *4–5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 8, 2008).
55. 824 F.3d at 886.
56. No Infringement for Trivial Copying of Sound Recording: Ninth Circuit, PRACTICAL LAW
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & TECHNOLOGY, W-002-5454 (June 3, 2016).
57. Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 795–96.
58. PARKS, supra note 43, at 163.
59. Id.
60. Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 796.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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the Hook Up, released by defendant No Limit Films, Westbound filed suit
alleging unauthorized use of the “Get Off” sound recording sampled in “100
Miles.” 63
Although the district court in Bridgeport did find that the sample was
original, and thus entitled to copyright protection, it ended up granting summary
judgment for the defendants under the de minimis exception. 64 The court made
this determination by analyzing both the quantitative and qualitative factors of
the sample. 65 It found minimal quantitative copying (the sample was only four
seconds of the two and half minute running time of “Get Off,” while the total
length of all the looped segments comprised nearly forty seconds of “100
Miles”) and a “lack of qualitative similarity” between the works (the sample was
made to sound like police sirens in “100 Miles,” a song about four black men
being wrongly pursued by law enforcement, whereas the same riff in “Get Off”
kicks off a celebratory dance anthem). 66 The court found that “no reasonable
jury, even one familiar with the works of George Clinton (the author of “Get
Off”), would recognize the source of the sample without having been told.” 67
Thus the Bridgeport district court found that the sample used in “100 Miles” did
not “rise to the level of a legally cognizable appropriation” and dismissed
Westbound’s copyright infringement claims. 68
However, when the case went up on appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the
district court’s summary judgment ruling. 69 The Sixth Circuit’s analysis in
Bridgeport focused on 17 U.S.C. § 114(a)-(b), the statute detailing the exclusive
rights of sound recording copyright owners. 70 Section 114(b) states that:
The exclusive right of the owner of copyright in a sound recording under clause
[two] of section 106 71 is limited to the right to prepare a derivative work in
which the actual sounds fixed in the sound recording are rearranged, remixed,
or otherwise altered in sequence or quality. 72

63. Id. at 795. Bridgeport Music, the lead plaintiff in the case, owned the music composition
rights to “Get Off” and also brought an action for copyright infringement against the defendants;
however, the district court dismissed this claim upon finding the defendants were authorized to use
the sample by a previous agreement. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 230 F. Supp. 2d
830, 838 (M.D. Tenn. 2002). This Note will focus specifically on the sound recording claim.
64. Bridgeport, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 839, 842–43.
65. Id. at 841.
66. Id. at 841–42.
67. Id. at 842.
68. Id. at 841–42.
69. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 798 (6th Cir. 2005).
70. Id. at 799.
71. Section 106(2) gives owners of sound recording copyrights the exclusive rights “to prepare
derivative works based upon the copyrighted work.” 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2012).
72. 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (2012).
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The Sixth Circuit reasoned this to mean that the copyright owner maintains the
exclusive rights to “sample” his or her own sound recording. 73 Therefore, any
artist who directly takes “something less than the whole” from the sound
recording without prior permission from the copyright owner commits copyright
infringement. 74
In Bridgeport, the Sixth Circuit’s analysis both began and ended with the
above statute; not only did the court choose not to perform a de minimis analysis
like the district court, but it went so far as to explicitly conclude that the de
minimis exception could not apply to copyright infringement claims involving
sound recordings at all. 75 The Sixth Circuit held that the analysis used to
determine infringement of a musical composition copyright is not the same as
the analysis used in sound recording copyright infringement cases, and in
applying a de minimis analysis, the Bridgeport district court had incorrectly
treated the case as if it were a musical composition copyright infringement
claim. 76 Why should the analysis of a copyright infringement claim involving a
musical composition be any different from that of a sound recording? To answer
that question, the Sixth Circuit first pointed to the previously mentioned statute,
which it argued precluded the de minimis exception by giving copyright owners
exclusive rights to sample their own music. 77 Additionally, the court noted that
sampling a sound recording is not just duplication; it is actual and purposeful
copying, “a physical taking rather than an intellectual one.” 78
The Sixth Circuit listed a variety of policy reasons for creating a bright-line
rule instead of allowing defendants to argue against copyright infringement
using a de minimis exception. First, a bright-line rule makes enforcing
copyrights easier. 79 The Sixth Circuit said that the Bridgeport district court
opinion “illustrate[d] the kind of mental, musicological, and technological
gymnastics that would have to be employed if one were to adopt a de minimis or
substantial similarity analysis.” 80 While it did commend the district court
judge’s “excellent job of navigating [the] troubled waters” of a de minimis
analysis, it referenced the earlier split of the Bridgeport claims into several
hundred different cases—all involving different samples from different songs—
and said that considering the time and effort that would be put into analyzing
each of those cases, “the value of a principled bright-line rule becomes
apparent.” 81 A bright-line rule could make things easier for artists too, as it
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 801.
Id. at 800; Schietinger, supra note 31, at 228.
Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 798–99.
Id. at 798.
Id. at 800–01.
Id. at 802.
Id. at 801.
Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 802.
Id.
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makes the law much less confusing for those interested in sampling from a
copyrighted work. 82 As the presiding judge in Bridgeport so clearly stated, “Get
a license or do not sample.” 83 The court argued that this strict rule does not stifle
creativity in any way, stating that if an artist wanted to incorporate a segment
from another song into his or her own, the artist “is free to duplicate the sound
of that ‘riff’ in the studio.” 84
In addition to those judicial efficiency arguments, the court considered the
economy of the music industry, pointing out that it is “cheaper to license than to
litigate” and reasoning that copyright holders and artists alike would prefer to
spend their resources obtaining license agreements rather than litigating costly
copyright infringement cases. 85 In terms of the price of licensing, the Sixth
Circuit employed a sort of efficient market theory to keep the license price
“within bounds.” 86 “The sound recording copyright holder cannot exact a license
fee greater than what it would cost the person seeking the license to just duplicate
the sample in the course of making the new recording,” the court stated. 87
Finally, in a tone somewhat reminiscent of the “thou shalt not steal” line
from the Grand Upright opinion, the Sixth Circuit noted that “sampling is never
accidental. . . . [w]hen you sample a sound recording you know you are taking
another’s work product.” 88 Sampling is an actual copying, a “physical taking”
of a segment of a copyright work, and the Sixth Circuit decided that reasoning
was sufficient to ignore a de minimis analysis like employed in musical
composition copyright infringement cases and instead establish a bright-line
rule. 89
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN VMG SALSOUL
Despite the response Bridgeport received, 90 Congress did not take any steps
to clarify the law in the years following the decision, nor does it seem that the
music industry made any requests for it to do so, as the Sixth Circuit had
suggested. 91 And despite the variety of decisions being made by the district
courts that were not bound by the Sixth Circuit’s decision, no other circuit court
decided to take up the issue. 92 It was not until VMG Salsoul was decided by the
Ninth Circuit in June 2016 that the issue of the de minimis exception’s
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id. at 801.
Id.
Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 802.
Id. at 801.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 802.
See supra note 54 and corresponding text.
Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 805.
VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 886 (9th Cir. 2016).
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applicability to sound recording copyright infringement claims was discussed
again by a circuit court. 93
The copyright infringement claim in VMG Salsoul revolved around
Madonna’s popular 1990 song “Vogue.” 94 Shep Pettibone—who, along with
Madonna herself, was a defendant in the case—produced the sound recording
for the song. 95 While recording “Vogue,” Pettibone sampled sounds from a
recording of “Ooh I Love It (Love Break),” a song he had recorded in the early
1980s for the Salsoul Orchestra. 96 The copied sounds included two different
“horn hits” from “Love Break”: a “single” horn hit that consisted of an 0.23second quarter-note chord played predominantly by trombones and trumpets,
and a “double” horn hit that consisted of an eighth-note and quarter-note with
the same notes and instruments. 97 Pettibone copied the single horn hit, raised the
pitch a half-step, and inserted it five different times through “Vogue.” 98 Those
facts led VMG Salsoul, the company that owned the copyrights for “Love
Break,” to file suit asserting that the defendants violated the “Love Break” sound
recording copyright by sampling from the song. 99
The district court in VMG Salsoul granted the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, finding that the “Love Break” horn hits were “not
sufficiently unique to be a copyrighted element of the sound recording” and
therefore not subject to copyright protection. 100 However, the court also
performed a de minimis analysis and found that even if the horn hits had been
protected under copyright law, Pettibone’s sampling of them was de minimis. 101
When the judgment was appealed, the Ninth Circuit also undertook a de
minimis inquiry to determine whether the sampling was significant enough to

93. Id.
94. Id. at 874.
95. VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, No. CV 12-05967 (BRO) (CWx), 2013 WL 8600435, at
*1 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2013).
96. VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 875; Salsoul Orchestra, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Salsoul_Orchestra [https://perma.cc/3B9C-3GGZ].
97. VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 875.
98. Id. at 875–76. The plaintiff in the case also challenged another version of “Vogue” created
by Pettibone, the “compilation” version, which is about thirty seconds longer and contained a
different variation of the sampled horn hits. Id. at 876.
99. Id. at 874. VMG Salsoul also alleged that the defendants violated its copyright to the music
composition of “Love Break,” and the court found that “[a] reasonable jury could not conclude that
an average audience would recognize an appropriation of the Love Break composition.” Id. at 875,
879. This Note, however, will focus solely on the court’s analysis and conclusion regarding the
sound recording copyright infringement claim.
100. VMG Salsoul, 2013 WL 8600435 at *8, *12.
101. Id. at *11. The district court concluded that, “no reasonable audience would find the
sampled portions qualitatively or quantitatively significant in relation to the infringing work, nor
would they recognize the appropriation.” Id. at *12.
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establish a copyright infringement claim. 102 The court pointed out that the length
of the horn hit is “very short,” it occurs only a few times throughout “Vogue”
and is easy to miss unless the listener is paying careful attention, and it doesn’t
sound the same as the hit in “Love Break” because Pettibone transposed the
chord into a different key and added other sounds, effects, and instrument tracks
before adding it to “Vogue.” 103 After analyzing these facts, the court concluded
that no average audience member would recognize the appropriation of the horn
hit: “Even if one grants the dubious proposition that a listener recognized some
similarities between the horn hits in the two songs, it is hard to imagine that he
or she would conclude that sampling had occurred.” 104 Therefore, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that the copying of the sound
recording was de minimis. 105
In addition to arguing that the “Vogue” sampling amounted to more than a
de minimis copying, VMG Salsoul urged the Ninth Circuit to follow the Sixth
Circuit’s bright-line rule in Bridgeport and find that the de minimis exception
does not apply at all to claims of copyright infringement of sound recordings. 106
However, the Ninth Circuit—after looking closely at case law, copyright
statutes, and evidence of congressional intent—decided that the exception does
still apply, even in allegations specifically regarding sound recordings. 107
Aside from the Bridgeport decision, the Ninth Circuit could find no
evidence of another court that held that the de minimis doctrine does not apply
in a certain type of copyright infringement case. 108 Instead, it found that courts
consistently applied the de minimis analysis in cases of all types of copyright
infringement, and as stated in dictum in the Newton case, the doctrine was meant
to apply “throughout the law of copyright, including cases of music
sampling.” 109 Despite the existence of the de minimis exception throughout
copyright case law, the plaintiff in VMG Salsoul argued “that Congress intended
to create a special rule for copyrighted sound recordings, eliminating the de
minimis exception.” 110 But after analyzing copyright statutes and legislative
history, the Ninth Circuit rejected this argument as well. 111

102. VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 877. The Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiff had sufficient
facts to demonstrate actual copying, and therefore needed to prove that the copying was “significant
enough to constitute infringement,” in order “to establish its infringement claim, Plaintiff must
show that the copying was greater than de minimis.” Id. (emphasis added).
103. Id. at 880.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 884.
108. Id. at 881.
109. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 2003)).
110. Id. at 881 (emphasis added).
111. Id. at 884.
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Section 102 contains a list of categories of materials that are protected under
copyright law, and specifically included in that list are sound recordings. 112 The
Ninth Circuit noted in VMG Salsoul that the statute treats sound recordings the
same as the other types of materials: “[N]othing in the text suggests differential
treatment, for any purpose, of sound recordings.” 113 Even though, as the plaintiff
pointed out, there are some provisions within the code that do deal exclusively
with sound recordings or in some specific way limit the protections offered to
them, none of those provisions speak to “whether Congress intended to eliminate
the longstanding de minimis exception for sound recordings in all circumstances
. . . .” 114 The court also pointed to legislative history, which included a passage
in which Congress, while discussing statutory protections for sound recordings,
stated that “infringement takes place whenever all or any substantial portion of
the actual sounds . . . are reproduced.” 115 The Ninth Circuit found this to be
evidence that Congress “clearly understood” the de minimis exception to apply
to copyrighted sound recordings, just as it did to all other copyright works, and
that it intended to maintain that exception for sound recordings. 116
One of the Sixth Circuit’s arguments in Bridgeport was that the de minimis
exception should not apply to sound recordings because they are “physical
taking[s].” 117 The Ninth Circuit disagreed with this determination for three
different reasons. First, it pointed out that the de minimis exception is allowed
in cases involving “physical taking[s]” of other types of copyrightable works,
such as photographs. 118 The court also reasoned that even if sound recordings
do “differ qualitatively from other copyrighted works” so that they could
potentially warrant a different rule, that difference does not mean that Congress
necessarily adopted a different rule. 119 Finally, it criticized the Sixth Circuit’s
distinction between an “intellectual taking” and a “physical taking” by citing the
Supreme Court’s view that the Copyright Act protects only the “expressive
aspects of a copyrighted work,” instead of the “fruit of the [author’s] labor.” 120
Because no distinction should exist, the court reasoned that Bridgeport was
simply arguing that expressive content had been taken from the original artist,
112. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
113. VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 881–82. The court also cites 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) as another
example of Congress treating sound recordings identically to other types of copyrightable works.
Id. at 882.
114. Id. at 883 (emphasis added).
115. Id. at 884 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 61 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5674).
116. Id.
117. VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 885; Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792,
802 (6th Cir. 2005).
118. VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 885.
119. Id.
120. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S.
340, 349 (1991)).
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and “that is always true, regardless of the nature of the work, and the de mimimis
test nevertheless applies.” 121
The Ninth Circuit also dismissed VMG Salsoul’s argument that the
Bridgeport rule should stand as a matter of policy, as well as its argument that
because Congress did not amend the copyright statute in response to the
Bridgeport ruling, the Sixth Circuit’s decision should stand. 122 “The Supreme
Court has held that congressional inaction in the face of a judicial statutory
interpretation . . . carries almost no weight,” the Ninth Circuit stated in its
opinion, pointing out that Congress’s inaction had “even less import,”
considering the fact that many district courts declined to follow the Bridgeport
rule. 123 It also responded directly to the Sixth Circuit’s policy reasons for
creating the Bridgeport bright-line rule, such as easy enforceability, by stating
that “[t]hose arguments are for a legislature, not a court. They speak to what
Congress could decide; they do not inform what Congress actually decided.” 124
It is clear in VMG Salsoul that the Ninth Circuit did not take lightly its
decision to disagree with the Sixth Circuit, as it was well-aware of the
“particularly troublesome” nature of a circuit split, particularly in the world of
copyright, where inconsistent rules “lead to different levels of protection in
different areas of the country.” 125 But, citing its “independent duty to determine
congressional intent” and the alternative of being forced to “blindly follow” a
rule it believed to be incorrect just because another circuit decided the issue first,
it chose to maintain the applicability of the de minimis exception to actions
alleging infringement of a copyright to sound recordings. 126 The court also
pointed out that the leading copyright treatise, Nimmer on Copyright, disagreed
with the Bridgeport opinion, and that nearly every district court outside of the
Sixth Circuit has declined to follow the Bridgeport opinion when faced with the
issue of applying the de minimis exception to copyrighted sound recordings;
although the Ninth Circuit was the first federal circuit court to come to a different
conclusion than Bridgeport, it was “in well-chartered territory.” 127
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE BRIDGEPORT AND VMG SALSOUL CIRCUIT SPLIT
There is no doubt that a circuit split in any area of the law is an unwelcome
occurrence. Disagreement among the courts creates uncertainty about the law.
If people are expected to conform to a law, it is only fair that its meaning and
applicability is clearly communicated to them so they can follow it

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 885 (emphasis added).
Id. at 886.
Id. at 886–87.
Id. at 887.
Id. at 886.
VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 886–87.
Id. at 886.
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accordingly. 128 And as the Ninth Circuit noted in VMG Salsoul, a circuit split in
the area of copyright law is particularly problematic, as “inconsistent rules
among the circuits would lead to different levels of protection in different areas
of the country, even if the same alleged infringement is occurring
nationwide.” 129 It is therefore in the best interest of both the legal community
and the music industry to see the resolution of this circuit split over the use of
the de minimis exception in sound recording copyright cases. After analyzing
both circuits’ decisions, the best resolution would be to follow the Ninth
Circuit’s ruling and allow a de minimis exception in copyright infringement
cases involving sound recording claims. As discussed below, this is the rule that
would best fit within the contexts of Congress’s role in making copyright law,
efficiency among the courts, and the general purpose and aims of copyright law,
and would have the most positive impact on the music industry.
A.

The Role and the Intent of Congress

The ability to create copyright law is an enumerated power given to
Congress in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. 130 Because Congress’s role
in creating copyright law is so important—and because a large part of both the
Bridgeport and VMG Salsoul opinions turn on the interpretation of § 114(b) of
the 1976 Copyright Act, the statute that protects a copyright owner’s right to a
sound recording 131—it is important to first analyze whether or not Congress
intended for a de minimis exception to apply within the realm of digital
sampling.
When the Sixth Circuit ruled that a de minimis analysis could not be used in
sound recording copyright cases, 132 it did away with the idea of substantial
similarity in the context of those types of cases, and in doing so created a rule
“at odds with the balance of jurisprudence” that forms the rest of American
copyright law. 133 Substantial similarity has long been an essential element in
forming an actionable copyright claim; as the Supreme Court stated in Newton,
“[E]ven where the fact of copying is conceded, no legal consequences will
follow from that fact unless the copying is substantial.” 134 Other copyright law

128. See Landgraf v. Usi Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994) (“Elementary considerations
of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to
conform their conduct accordingly . . . .”).
129. VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 886.
130. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
131. See VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 882–84; Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410
F.3d 792, 799–801 (6th Cir. 2005).
132. Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 801–02.
133. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER § 13.03[A][2][b].
134. Id. (quoting Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 2003)).
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claims allow a de minimis exception to be used; 135 in fact, the de minimis
doctrine is recognized as being especially important in copyright law because it
“can be used to identify both insignificant technical violations and those that fall
below the substantial similarity threshold.” 136
But as the Ninth Circuit pointed out, there are other provisions throughout
the Copyright Act in which sound recordings do receive different treatment and
are singled out accordingly; § 114(b), however, is not one of those sections. 137
The Ninth Circuit’s decision to take this fact as evidence that Congress did not
intend to create a distinction between sound recordings and other types of
copyrightable material when it comes to a de minimis exception is a logical one,
especially considering the legislative history. In a portion of § 114’s legislative
history, Congress explicitly noted that “infringement takes place whenever all
or any substantial portion of the actual sounds that go to make up a copyrighted
sound recording are reproduced in phonorecords by repressing, transcribing,
recapturing off the air, or any other method.” 138 As Nimmer on Copyright points
out, “had Bridgeport Music consulted § 114’s legislative history instead of
dismissing that history as irrelevant,” the Sixth Circuit might have realized that
its argument that Congress intended “to dispense with traditional notions of
substantial similarity”—and therefore, the de minimis exception—seems offbase. 139 The Sixth Circuit reasoned that the legislative history is “of little help”
because digital sampling was not being done in 1971 when § 114 of the
Copyright Act was being written by Congress. 140 However, as discussed earlier
in this Note, there were artists before and at the time the Copyright Act was
created who were copying portions of sound recordings for their own use. 141
Additionally, based on the “or any other method” language in the above-quoted

135. See, e.g., Prunté v. Universal Music Grp., Inc., 699 F. Supp. 2d 15, 19 (D.D.C. 2010)
(granting a motion for summary judgment for the defendant after analyzing a collection of lyrics
from artists on defendant’s label and finding the words and ideas were not substantially similar to
those of the plaintiff’s); Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215, 218 (2d Cir. 1998)
(using a substantial similarity analysis to determine that several photographs appearing briefly in a
movie was de minimis); Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 75 (2d Cir. 1997)
(using a substantial similarity analysis to determine that a television station’s use of a copyrighted
poster that was visible in that background of a scene was more than de minimis); Mathews
Conveyor Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73, 84–85 (6th Cir. 1943) (recognizing a general de
minimis analysis for copyright cases when it dismissed on de minimis grounds the plaintiff’s claim
alleging copyright infringement against a defendant who used the same sketches plaintiff had used
in its catalog).
136. Schietinger, supra note 31, at 231 (citing Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 74–75).
137. VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 882 (9th Cir. 2016).
138. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 106 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5674
(emphasis added).
139. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 133, § 13.03[A][2][b].
140. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 805 (6th Cir. 2005).
141. See supra Section I.B.
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legislative history, it seems as though Congress did actually foresee the
possibility of technology being advanced to the point of being able to easily copy
small portions of sound recordings, and it “decided to retain the universally
accepted notion of substantial similarity under those circumstances.” 142
Therefore, the fact that the digital sampler was not created until the 1970s does
not make the legislative history of § 114 irrelevant.
Additionally, prohibiting the use of a de minimis exception directly conflicts
with the concept of fair use, another defense that is used throughout copyright
law, including in the area of digital sampling and sound recordings. 143 The fair
use defense allows for the reproduction of copyrighted works for certain specific
“fair” uses (such as teaching, scholarship, or research) and is codified in § 107
of the Copyright Act. 144 In determining whether the unauthorized use of a
copyrighted work falls within the doctrine of fair use, § 107 sets out four factors
that should be considered, one of which is “the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.” 145 If a defendant
who sampled from a copyrighted sound recording wanted to use the fair use
defense against an allegation of copyright infringement, evidence would have to
be presented as to the amount and substantiality of the sample in relation to the
entire sound recording, and the court would have to consider this; in essence, the
court would have to perform a de minimis analysis. It seems illogical to prohibit
the use of the de minimis exception when it forms part of the fair use analysis, a
defense that is already considered acceptable to use in cases involving sound
recording copyrights.
The plaintiffs in VMG Salsoul argued that because Congress did not amend
the copyright statute at any point in the eleven years between the Bridgeport and
VMG Salsoul decisions to clarify whether or not a de minimis exception should
apply to sound recording cases, the Sixth Circuit’s decision correctly matched
Congress’s intent. 146 But as the Ninth Circuit pointed out, this argument is

142. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 133, at 13-62 n.114.17.
143. Schietinger, supra note 31, at 235. Even the Sixth Circuit acknowledges the fair use
defense in the realm of sound recording copyright cases: the court concluded the Bridgeport
decision by stating that “[s]ince the district judge found no infringement, there was no necessity to
consider the affirmative defense of ‘fair use.’ On remand, the trial judge is free to consider this
defense and we express no opinion on its applicability to these facts.” Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 805.
Therefore, in the Bridgeport opinion, the Sixth Circuit created a rule that a de minimis or substantial
similarity analysis could not be used in sound recording cases, but also allowed a defendant the
possibility to prevail if it can establish fair use, when one of the factors of that defense includes a
substantial similarity analysis. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 133, § 13.03[A][2]; see Campbell
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 571–72 (1994) (ruling that the defendant could use a fair
use defense in a case involving digital sampling).
144. 17 U.S.C § 107 (2012).
145. 17 U.S.C § 107(3) (emphasis added).
146. VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 886 (9th Cir. 2016).
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unconvincing. 147 First, the Supreme Court itself has held that a lack of
congressional action concerning a court’s interpretation of a statute “carries
almost no weight,” so Congress not speaking up at any point after the Bridgeport
decision does not necessarily mean it agreed. 148 Additionally, so many other
courts have declined to follow the Bridgeport rule that Congress’s lack of
response to a decision by one circuit seems to be of even less importance. 149
B.

The Idea of Judicial Efficiency

It is also important to consider the two circuits’ rulings in terms of judicial
efficiency, because both the Sixth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit address it in their
opinions and note its importance. 150 “Judicial efficiency” (or “judicial
economy”) refers to efficiency in the operation of the courts and the justice
system as a whole, particularly “the efficient management of litigation so as to
. . . avoid wasting the judiciary’s time and resources.” 151 A bright-line rule is
often considered to be more efficient for the courts, but this does not necessarily
mean that the Sixth Circuit’s prohibition of the de minimis exception is in the
interest of judicial efficiency.
One of the benefits of a bright-line rule is that it can establish consistency in
the rulings of cases within an area of law and provide clarity for what the law
actually is. Surely that was one of the Sixth Circuit’s interests in creating a
bright-line prohibiting the de minimis exception in Bridgeport; 152 however, that
goal was not achieved. As previously mentioned, after the Bridgeport decision
was made, it was immediately criticized by leading legal scholars, and nearly
every district court not bound by the Sixth Circuit’s opinion declined to follow
it. 153 Any goal the Sixth Circuit had in creating more consistency, clarity, and
efficiency among the courts by adopting a bright-line rule was clearly not met.
Another argument the Sixth Circuit made for prohibiting a de minimis
analysis was that it would decrease litigation, an idea that stemmed from the fact
that the Bridgeport case discussed in this Note was just one of nearly 500 claims
of copyright infringement alleged by those same plaintiffs. 154 The court
reasoned that a bright-line, “get a license or do not sample” rule would
encourage artists to get licenses instead of getting involved in litigation, thus

147. Id.
148. Id. “It is ‘impossible to assert with any degree of assurance that congressional failure to
act represents’ affirmative congressional approval of the Court’s statutory interpretation.”
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 292 (2001) (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491
U.S. 164, 175 n.1 (1989)).
149. VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 887.
150. Id.; Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 802 (6th Cir. 2005).
151. Judicial Economy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2009).
152. Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 802.
153. VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 886.
154. PARKS, supra note 43, at 163; supra Part II.
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decreasing the amount of cases being brought into court. 155 However, this seems
to suggest that copyright litigation is already rampant, while in reality not every
case of copyright infringement ends up going to court: some because they are
settled by the parties, and many more because attorneys make the determination
that the claim is not worth the time and money to litigate. 156 A bright-line rule
could even potentially create more litigation: “[T]he open-ended nature of [the
Bridgeport] ruling invites all kinds of frivolous lawsuits that will benefit neither
artists nor fans.” 157 “Get a license or do not sample” 158 is a bright-line rule that
guarantees a ruling in favor of the copyright owner in any sampling case that
goes to trial, and therefore in a way encourages the owner to bring an
infringement claim “anytime their music is sampled, no matter how
insignificant.” 159 A bright-line rule may make the process of deciding an
individual case more efficient, but if it also spurs an increase in the number of
cases that are litigated, that is hardly a win for judicial efficiency. 160
C. The Purpose of American Copyright Law
As previously discussed, the fundamental goal of American copyright law
as set out in the Constitution is to “promote the Progress” of art and the creation
of new works. 161 With that in mind, perhaps the most disheartening part of the
Bridgeport opinion is that it clearly misunderstands the role digital sampling
plays in the music industry and the importance and creativity of that manner of
making music. The Sixth Circuit’s decision fails to recognize sampling as a
legitimate form of art, one that “has the potential to be inventive and
influential,” 162 and one that pays homage to other artists and cultures. 163 Thus,
forbidding de minimis sampling of sound recordings goes directly against the
goal of American copyright law to promote progress and creativity.
While the rule set out in Bridgeport undoubtedly simplifies the law for the
music industry—“get a license or do not sample” could hardly be any clearer—
155. Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 801–02.
156. DEMERS, supra note 6, at 113. In the book, a former attorney for the Disney Corporation
describes the process of assessing potential copyright claims, stating that in-house attorneys first
determine whether there is an actionable claim, then make a “real-world determination” of whether
or not the company will make any money, whether the public will even see the work at issue, and
if the company even “really care[s].” Id. Based on that description, it almost seems as though
attorneys for record labels and artists do their own de minimis analysis before even bringing a claim
to court.
157. Schietinger, supra note 31, at 245 (quoting Renee Graham, An Anti-Sampling Court
Ruling Limits the Options of Hip-Hop’s Best, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 16, 2004, at D1).
158. Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 801.
159. Schietinger, supra note 31, at 245–46.
160. Id. at 246.
161. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
162. Schietinger, supra note 31, at 234.
163. DEMERS, supra note 6, at 4.
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it also “chills a lot of artistic expression.” 164 Under the Sixth Circuit’s rule,
sampling even the smallest portions of a copyrighted sound recording could no
longer be a “viable option” for some artists, as they would be forced to pay an
expensive fee to license the sound recording. 165 The clearance of samples can be
extremely time-consuming and expensive for both independent musicians and
major label artists alike, adding tens of thousands of dollars to production costs
and amounting to “a legal and administrative hassle.” 166 And for many artists, it
is hardly a practical alternative to duplicate certain sounds in a studio instead of
sampling them, as the Sixth Circuit suggested in Bridgeport. 167 Not all
musicians can afford to purchase a variety of instruments or studio time, both of
which can be extremely expensive. 168 Digital sampling is one technology that
has allowed more people to create music for less money, but those same people
would likely be precluded from making music under the Bridgeport rule.
Additionally, requiring all artists to seek permission through a license before
sampling a portion of a sound recording gives copyright owners the ability to
censor, “denying permission to anyone whose musical message they dislike.” 169
The possibility of censorship directly conflicts with the ideas of progress and
creativity, ideas that provide the base of American copyright law.
Of course, it would be unwise to ignore that the Constitution also seeks to
give some protection for copyright owners to further the above-mentioned goal,
and copyright law today seeks to balance these two sometimes conflicting
interests. 170 But in the realm of de minimis digital sampling, those two aims do
not necessarily conflict.
One writer analogized prohibiting a de minimis sampling of sound
recordings to “requiring a painter to obtain a license [to use] the canvas upon

164. Marjorie Heins, Trashing the Copyright Balance, FREE EXPRESSION POL’Y PROJECT
(Sept. 21, 2004), http://www.fepproject.org/commentaries/bridgeport.html [https://perma.cc/2QN
Z-R8ZG].
165. Schietinger, supra note 31, at 233–34.
166. Schietinger, supra note 31, at 238 (quoting Michael L. Baroni, A Pirate’s Palette: The
Dilemmas of Digital Sound Sampling and a Proposed Compulsory License Solution, 11 U. MIAMI
ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 65, 93 (1993)). It was reported that the second album of De La Soul, a hiphop group well-known for its use of sampling, was released in 1991 and “featured more than 50
samples and cost over $100,000 in clearance and legal fees.” Baroni, supra at 92–93. Public Enemy,
another hip-hop group hailed for its creative use of samples, says it now follows a flat-out “no
samples” policy: “We don’t have the man power or the legal power or the money to deal with those
issues.” DEMERS, supra note 6, at 119 (quoting Walter Leaphard).
167. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 801 (6th Cir. 2005).
168. Scheitinger, supra note 31, at 236 nn.234–37.
169. Heins, supra note 164. An example of this occurred when the owners of the copyright to
the song “Oh Pretty Woman” by Ray Orbison denied a “raunchy rap group,” Two Live Crew,
permission to record a much more vulgar version of the song. Id. These types of situations could
be resolved through compulsory licensing—but that is another topic for another note.
170. Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 800.
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which he paints.” 171 Like a painter’s canvas, a sample of a sound recording is
just the “starting point” for a new creative work: “[A]lthough it provides an
important foundation for the work, it is not identifiable with the final product
and the creativity of the work stands on its own.” 172 Following that logic, a de
minimis exception for digital sampling cases would also not go against the
second aim of copyright law—to protect the rights of copyright owners—
because the analysis courts would perform would separate artists who use tiny
portions of a copyrighted work and transform them into something new, unique,
and completely unrecognizable from those artists who directly copy
everything. 173 That second purpose of copyright law seeks to “deter wholesale
plagiarism of prior works,” 174 and de minimis samples where the original work
is far from recognizable can hardly be considered “wholesale plagiarism.”
Finally, prohibiting a de minimis exception is simply “profoundly wrong as
a matter of copyright principles.” 175 As stated by a judge in one of the earliest
copyright cases over 150 years ago, “Every book in literature, science and art,
borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and use much which was well known and
used before.” 176 The de minimis exception is one way in which copyright law
“acknowledges the importance of creative copying.” 177
D. The Impact on the Music Industry
Although the Ninth Circuit chose not to perform a policy analysis in VMG
Salsoul, 178 it remains important to discuss as the Sixth Circuit did make several
policy arguments in Bridgeport, 179 and the rule does indeed have effects on the
music community. A bright-line rule forbidding a de minimis exception in sound
recording copyright cases has been shown to have a negative impact on the
music community, and in turn, on society in general. 180
The Bridgeport decision has directly impacted the music industry in terms
of the way artists and labels treated works containing sampled sound
recordings. 181 It has changed the advice copyright attorneys give their clients:
171. Schietinger, supra note 31, at 234 (quoting Nate Lindell, Are Courts Really CopyrightCompetent?, (Oct. 7, 2004).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 230 F. Supp. 2d 830, 842 (M.D. Tenn. 2002).
175. Heins, supra note 164.
176. Id. (quoting Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (No. 4,436) (C.C.D. Mass. 1845)).
177. Heins, supra note 164.
178. VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 887 (9th Cir. 2016). The court said that the
Sixth Circuit’s policy arguments were “for a legislature, not a court” and spoke “to what Congress
could decide” as opposed to what it actually decided, and therefore it did not address those issues.
Id.
179. Supra Part II.
180. Howell, supra note 26, at 28; Schietinger, supra note 31, at 246.
181. MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 32, at 141–44.
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instead of saying that de minimis samplings are fine without being cleared, the
opinion has become that “even if you can’t hear a sample of the sound recording,
you still have to clear it.” 182 And instead of a bright-line rule clearing up
confusion within the music industry, as Bridgeport believed it would, 183 many
artists have been left with even more questions. 184 Some artists also see the rule
as an unfair change, since it directly contradicts how many previously
understood copyright law. 185
Perhaps even worse—especially when considered within the context of the
general purpose of copyright law—is the effect the Sixth Circuit’s decision has
had on creativity within the music industry. Upon release of the Bridgeport
opinion, reactions by those within the industry ranged from somber to full-on
civil disobedience, 186 and overall, many described the decision as
“extraordinarily chilling.” 187 Some experts also have seen “ripple effects” of the
decision on other genres of music, such as jazz and blues, that don’t directly
involve sampling but rather less-direct forms of “musical borrowing.” 188 Even
though the Bridgeport ruling only affected sound recordings, some within the
music industry have become more cautious and seek to clear uses of small
portions of musical compositions as well “just to be safe.” 189 This suggests that
there are amounts of time and money being wasted, and perhaps even artists who
are dissuaded from borrowing at all because of the fear of a lawsuit. Overall,
many view the law as a “threat” and as “impos[ing] more blockades,” 190 and as
yet another control “blocking society’s access to cultural resources.” 191 “[N]ot
all good music today is created in entertainment industry studios,” 192 and with
the Bridgeport decision making sampling so much more expensive, many fear
that the bright-line rule it created prohibiting the de minimis exception could

182. Id. at 142 (quoting Whitney Broussard).
183. Supra notes 81–82 and corresponding text.
184. MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 32, at 142.
185. Id. Some record labels have taken advantage of the retroactive nature of the Sixth Circuit’s
rule and continued to bring lawsuits, targeting artists who sampled copyrighted sound recordings
at a time when the practice was considered legal. Id. at 142–43.
186. Id. at 143. Digital activist group Downhill Battle created an online demonstration in the
wake of the Sixth Circuit’s decision that encouraged the public to create songs made solely from
the “Get Off Your Ass and Jam” sample from the Bridgeport case, which they then made available
online. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 143–44.
189. MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 32, at 144.
190. Id. at 143.
191. DEMERS, supra note 6, at 4.
192. Schietinger, supra note 31, at 247 (quoting Heins, supra note 164).
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completely silence independent artists and in the long-run “lead to mediocrity in
the music.” 193
Allowing the de minimis exception naturally has a more positive impact on
the music community because it allows for increased creativity by artists, even
those who are not represented by a major label. And although a de minimis
exception promotes creativity among those artists who do sample, this does not
necessarily mean the rule would be harmful to those who do not. As previously
stated, a de minimis analysis actually deters against the “wholesale plagiarism
of prior works,” striking a balance between protecting the rights and interests of
the copyright owner while also not “depriving other artists of the building blocks
of future works.” 194
V. CONCLUSION
A circuit split is never the preferred outcome, but the Ninth Circuit made the
right decision to split from the Sixth Circuit and allow a de minimis exception
for sampled sound recordings. Of course, it is to the benefit of both the legal
community and the music industry that the circuit split eventually be resolved. 195
And when it is resolved, the law should follow the decision set out in VMG
Salsoul and a de minimis analysis should become the standard when analyzing
copyright infringement claims concerning sound recordings.
Allowing a de minimis exception for sound recording copyright
infringement claims best matches Congress’s intent in creating the Copyright
Act of 1976, as shown by the legislative history and in the context of other
copyright doctrines. It also does not go against the idea of judicial efficiency,
while a bright-line, “get a license or do not sample” rule does little to promote
that goal. Prohibiting a de minimis exception also directly conflicts with the
purpose of American copyright law, while allowing one promotes it. Finally, the
existence of the de minimis exception actually has a positive impact on the music
community, while prohibiting one has created a negative result.
Decisions like Bridgeport unfortunately promote the idea that copyright law
is a “constraint on creativity,” that it is “categorically harmful.” 196 But the
framers of the Constitution specifically empowered Congress to create copyright
law to “promote the Progress” of the arts and to foster creativity and the creation

193. Id. (citing Renee Graham, An Anti-Sampling Court Ruling Limits the Options of Hip-Hop’s
Best, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 16, 2004, at D1) (quoting journalist Davey D. Cook).
194. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 230 F. Supp. 2d 830, 842 (M.D. Tenn. 2002).
195. VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 886 (9th Cir. 2016). One writer referred to
the Ninth Circuit’s decision as “sending up a signal flare to the Supreme Court!” Eric Goldman,
De Minimis Music Sampling Isn’t Infringement—Salsoul v. Madonna, TECH. & MARKETING L.
BLOG (June 3, 2016), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2016/06/de-minimis-music-samplingisnt-infringement-salsoul-v-madonna.htm [https://perma.cc/S8WH-G2HK].
196. DEMERS, supra note 6, at 113; MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 32, at 11–14.
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of new works, 197 ideas which seem to be the opposite of a “constraint.” Sampling
sound recordings has become an integral part of the process of creating new
musical works today, and resolving the circuit split to allow the use of the de
minimis exception in those types of cases would help reposition the public’s
opinion of copyright law to the balance the framers intended: as something that
protects the interests and rights of creators, but also fosters progress and
creativity in our nation.
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